Difference between revisions of "Security notes / Glossary"
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When designing a system, ask yourself the question: can a well placed single person with a bad agenda ruin
When designing a system, ask yourself the question: can a well placed single person with a bad agenda ruin life?
How would you protect against that?
How would you protect against that?
Revision as of 14:13, 10 May 2022
| Security related stuff.
- 1 Attacks
- 2 Access control
- 3 Hacking terminology
- 4 Unsorted
Least privilege (principle)
The principle of least privilege means each actor in a system should be able to access no more than it needs.
For example, you can say
- your web server should be denied to real all of the filesystem, except its own documents
- your backup program should
- be able to read most everything, but...
- not be able to run anything (beyond its own components)
- not be able to write anything except to the backup disk and its own logs
This is part of why functional accounts are often created for each such part: It's easier to handle this in broad terms even in simpler DAC setups, with just filesystem permissions.
When you want to crack down on this more thoroughly and more visibly, look at things like SELinux (because it adds MAC).
Note that the isolation in VMs and OS containers, are implicitly least-privilege as well: no connection to the outside unless permitted.
Discretionary Access Control (model)
Discretionary access control (DAC) means access to an object is at the discretion of the object's owner.
...more precisely, the identity of subjects. Usually that's owner-based, though e.g. capability systems often allow transfer to other parts.
Mainly contrasted with MAC
- permissions in most filesystems
Mandatory Access Control (model)
Mandatory access control (MAC) means that the system that decides to allow access between objects, instead of the object owners (though some systems apply MAC on top of DAC)
Often means labeling objects with particular categories, and having rules based on these categories.
Such (often-broad) labeling is often done for practical reasons: it often makes the rules simpler, which makes it more clear they express what you intended.
MAC usually means design up front, and reconsidering that full design on each change.
This is also why it often assists DAC, because
- while MAC is good at partitioning off parts of a system in broad terms (e.g. web server may only read under /var/www regardless of permissions),
- MAC it is less flexible at anything you can't describe fully at the design stage (like people sharing specific files securely).
- while you can sort of implement DAC with MAC, this is often so messy
- to the point that it may be harder to verify as being correct
Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) is focused on roles and role hierarchy, subjects and sessions.
It's a moderately detailed abstraction, considered a thing of its own, and a common reference for this sort of thing because these concepts cover a lot of typical needs of larger organisations
This makes it (possibly mainly the role part) a potential piece of of DAC, MAC and others.
Attribute-based access control
If you squint, there is sometimes very little difference between a category that a MAC system works on and a group that a DAC works on.
That is, very similar to users
The difference lies largely in who may change them - the admin, or the relevant user.
This is also roughly why there is value in mixing them. E.g. stricly separate web server, database, and other in terms of many resources. And have users as a third general pile, they can figure out among themselves and mostly just care about filesystem DAC anyway.