Difference between revisions of "Security notes / Glossary"

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AFAICT, there are are a lot of people who ''do'' use 'red teaming' and 'penetration testing' more or less interchangeably, with nuances.
 
  
And often semantics - even when the ''topics'' of nuance are often agreed on, the details are often not.
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AFAICT, people use the term in varied ways.
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In fact, a lot of them seem to use 'red teaming' and 'penetration testing' more or less interchangeably, with nuances.
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And often semantics. The ''topics'' of nuance are often agreed on, but the details are often not.
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Perhaps the difference is that pen testing often has more of a scope and is more of a 'see if there are holes in the perimeter and report them', whereas red teaming may be 'do whatever, see how far you can get', e.g. seeing what additional attacks may be feasible from inside.
 
Perhaps the difference is that pen testing often has more of a scope and is more of a 'see if there are holes in the perimeter and report them', whereas red teaming may be 'do whatever, see how far you can get', e.g. seeing what additional attacks may be feasible from inside.
  
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If you're just writing a report of what was wrong, you ''may'' just be specifying patches, not educating on how to build it better, and it's ''certainly'' just pen testing (with a cooler hat).
 
If you're just writing a report of what was wrong, you ''may'' just be specifying patches, not educating on how to build it better, and it's ''certainly'' just pen testing (with a cooler hat).
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Yet the wikipedia article seems to takes the opposite stance, because {{comment|(beyond saying "adds physical tests, and social engineering")}}
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it says "adds element of surprise" - basically meaning ''no'' blue team, or it is not informed.
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And maybe second that a decent team didn't find any obvious flaws,
 
And maybe second that a decent team didn't find any obvious flaws,
 
or that the things they found are not going to do much damage.
 
or that the things they found are not going to do much damage.
 
  
  

Revision as of 14:36, 10 May 2022

Security related stuff.

Practical


Theory / unsorted



how to do a login system badly
how to do encryption badly
Disk and file encryption notes


Attacks

Access control

Least privilege (principle)

The principle of least privilege means each actor in a system should be able to access no more than it needs.


For example, you can say

your web server should be denied to real all of the filesystem, except its own documents
your backup program should
be able to read most everything, but...
not be able to run anything (beyond its own components)
not be able to write anything except to the backup disk and its own logs


This is part of why functional accounts are often created for each such part: It's easier to handle this in broad terms even in simpler DAC setups, with just filesystem permissions.

When you want to crack down on this more thoroughly and more visibly, look at things like SELinux (because it adds MAC).


Note that the isolation in VMs and OS containers, are implicitly least-privilege as well: no connection to the outside unless permitted.


See also:



Discretionary Access Control (model)

Discretionary access control (DAC) means access to an object is at the discretion of the object's owner.


...more precisely, the identity of subjects. Usually that's owner-based, though e.g. capability systems often allow transfer to other parts.

Mainly contrasted with MAC

Examples:

permissions in most filesystems


Mandatory Access Control (model)

Mandatory access control (MAC) means that the system that decides to allow access between objects, instead of the object owners (though some systems apply MAC on top of DAC)


Often means labeling objects with particular categories, and having rules based on these categories.

Such (often-broad) labeling is often done for practical reasons: it often makes the rules simpler, which makes it more clear they express what you intended.


MAC usually means design up front, and reconsidering that full design on each change.

This is also why it often assists DAC, because

  • while MAC is good at partitioning off parts of a system in broad terms (e.g. web server may only read under /var/www regardless of permissions),
MAC it is less flexible at anything you can't describe fully at the design stage (like people sharing specific files securely).
  • while you can sort of implement DAC with MAC, this is often so messy
to the point that it may be harder to verify as being correct


Role-Based Access Control

Role-based access control (RBAC) is focused on roles and role hierarchy, subjects and sessions.

It's a moderately detailed abstraction, considered a thing of its own, and a common reference for this sort of thing because these concepts cover a lot of typical needs of larger organisations


This makes it (possibly mainly the role part) a potential piece of of DAC, MAC and others.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role-based_access_control


Attribute-based access control

Related notes

If you squint, there is sometimes very little difference between a category that a MAC system works on and a group that a DAC works on.

That is, very similar to users

The difference lies largely in who may change them - the admin, or the relevant user.

This is also roughly why there is value in mixing them. E.g. stricly separate web server, database, and other in terms of many resources. And have users as a third general pile, they can figure out among themselves and mostly just care about filesystem DAC anyway.

Hacking terminology

Passive recon

Attack vector

Attack surface, Attack factor

Attack tree

Red Team

Unsorted

Forward secrecy

Man in the middle

Two generals problem

The bitter ex test

Phishing

Worm, virus, trojan, etc.

Performative security, LARP security, cargo cult security

End to end encryption

Zero knowledge