Difference between revisions of "Security notes / Glossary"

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'''The two generals problem''' helps illustrate what you lost in unreliable channels.
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'''The two generals problem''' helps illustrate what you can and can't do over unreliable channels - which also has implications for security.
  
 
Basicaly, two bits of army need to communicate, but their messenger may be intercepted.
 
Basicaly, two bits of army need to communicate, but their messenger may be intercepted.
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Is it possible for those two generals to coordinate, even if the messenger might get intercepted?
 
Is it possible for those two generals to coordinate, even if the messenger might get intercepted?
 
This is largely about communication over unreliable channels, but also has implications for security.
 
  
  
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Intuitively, the problem is roughly that while it is possible to send precise messages,
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We assume that is possible to send precise messages, and can make them them impossible to imitate - those are not the issue at hand.
the possibility that the last was intercepted leads to various issues, ''some'' of which you can solve,  
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Intuitively, the issue is that that the last was intercepted leads to various issues, ''some'' of which you can solve,  
 
but others that you cannot.  
 
but others that you cannot.  
 
In particular, it means you may always be one step behind agreement or acknowledgment, even if most of your messages are acknowledgment.
 
In particular, it means you may always be one step behind agreement or acknowledgment, even if most of your messages are acknowledgment.
  
You can force the issue in abstraction by baking in a "I agree to never change my mind",  
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but that's not actually coordination anymore - particularly in the example's practice
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You can force the issue ''in abstraction'' by baking in a "I agree to never change my mind",
where the intercepting army may find out about the actual message, but also without that (e.g. using encryption).
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but that's not actually coordination anymore - particularly in the example's practice where the intercepting army may find out about the actual message,
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but even without that being an issue (e.g. using encryption).
  
 
You can mitigate the issue in practice, by sending important messages many times.
 
You can mitigate the issue in practice, by sending important messages many times.
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Understanding the tradeoffs turns out to be important in the design of  
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Understanding the tradeoffs turns out to be important in the design of network protocols,
network protocols, and in particular distributed consistency protocols,
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and in particular distributed consistency protocols,
 
and also to the expectations you can have of them.
 
and also to the expectations you can have of them.
  

Latest revision as of 16:59, 10 May 2022

Security related stuff.

Practical


Theory / unsorted



how to do a login system badly
how to do encryption badly
Disk and file encryption notes


Attacks

Access control

Least privilege (principle)

The principle of least privilege means each actor in a system should be able to access no more than it needs.


For example, you can say

your web server should be denied to real all of the filesystem, except its own documents
your backup program should
be able to read most everything, but...
not be able to run anything (beyond its own components)
not be able to write anything except to the backup disk and its own logs


This is part of why functional accounts are often created for each such part: It's easier to handle this in broad terms even in simpler DAC setups, with just filesystem permissions.

When you want to crack down on this more thoroughly and more visibly, look at things like SELinux (because it adds MAC).


Note that the isolation in VMs and OS containers, are implicitly least-privilege as well: no connection to the outside unless permitted.


See also:



Discretionary Access Control (model)

Discretionary access control (DAC) means access to an object is at the discretion of the object's owner.


...more precisely, the identity of subjects. Usually that's owner-based, though e.g. capability systems often allow transfer to other parts.

Mainly contrasted with MAC

Examples:

permissions in most filesystems


Mandatory Access Control (model)

Mandatory access control (MAC) means that the system that decides to allow access between objects, instead of the object owners (though some systems apply MAC on top of DAC)


Often means labeling objects with particular categories, and having rules based on these categories.

Such (often-broad) labeling is often done for practical reasons: it often makes the rules simpler, which makes it more clear they express what you intended.


MAC usually means design up front, and reconsidering that full design on each change.

This is also why it often assists DAC, because

  • while MAC is good at partitioning off parts of a system in broad terms (e.g. web server may only read under /var/www regardless of permissions),
MAC it is less flexible at anything you can't describe fully at the design stage (like people sharing specific files securely).
  • while you can sort of implement DAC with MAC, this is often so messy
to the point that it may be harder to verify as being correct


Role-Based Access Control

Role-based access control (RBAC) is focused on roles and role hierarchy, subjects and sessions.

It's a moderately detailed abstraction, considered a thing of its own, and a common reference for this sort of thing because these concepts cover a lot of typical needs of larger organisations


This makes it (possibly mainly the role part) a potential piece of of DAC, MAC and others.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Role-based_access_control


Attribute-based access control

Related notes

If you squint, there is sometimes very little difference between a category that a MAC system works on and a group that a DAC works on.

That is, very similar to users

The difference lies largely in who may change them - the admin, or the relevant user.

This is also roughly why there is value in mixing them. E.g. stricly separate web server, database, and other in terms of many resources. And have users as a third general pile, they can figure out among themselves and mostly just care about filesystem DAC anyway.

Hacking terminology

Passive recon

Attack vector

Attack surface, Attack factor

Attack tree

Red Team

Unsorted

Forward and backward secrecy

Man in the middle

Two generals problem

The bitter ex test

Phishing

Worm, virus, trojan, etc.

Performative security, LARP security, cargo cult security

End to end encryption

Zero knowledge