Difference between revisions of "Security notes / Message signing notes"

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* easy to implement (much easier than asymmetric key crypto)
* easy to implement (much easier than asymmetric key cryptography)
* a third party passively listening to this communication  
* a third party passively listening to this communication  

Latest revision as of 00:55, 26 April 2022

Security related stuff.


Theory / unsorted

  • Message signing notes

how to do a login system badly
how to do encryption badly
Disk and file encryption notes

Hash as verifier; message integrity

You do a hash on the source side, and make the receiving side do the same hash, and compare them.

This is generally a good indicator of both success on success, and of failure on failure, needs only a tiny amount of further transfer.


  • speed: as fast as possible
  • robustness: hash should have avalanche effect

Doesn't care much about:

  • keyspace size
  • being a secure hash (but it's sometimes a nice bonus)

Checks against obvious garbled data

Detecting unintentional corruption of transmitted data is useful to avoid some very basic misbehaviour, and doesn't have to be complex at all to significantly lower the chances of that happening.

There are some things so simple they are barely hashes, but serve the same function

four different methods, but all necessarily simple. Odd is arguably the best, but not by much.
not actually used a lot - they give very little protection, and there is no automatic fix
...so you're better off adding your own checking (and possible correction) at protocol level
  • GPS (specifically the NMEA 0183 text protocol)
per line, all characters are XORed together. The resulting byte is appended as hex, e.g. the 06 in
which is weak protection, but enough to ignore most garbled lines
  • Barcodes tend to have a check digit, meaning it does not carry any information, other than checking that some math involving all digits needs to check out. This avoids a lot of incorrect scans
For example, ISBNs (used on books) have their last digit as a check digit
  • IPv4 uses a 16-bit checksum (of the header only) that is basically just addition[1]
  • TCP over IPv4 uses a 16-bit checksum (of header and payload) that is basically just addition[2]
  • TCP over IPv6 uses a 16-bit checksum (of header and payload) that is basically just addition[3]

More serious but still relatively simple hashes include:

  • XMODEM used a sum of bytes, a later variant used 16-bit CRC instead
  • YMODEM used a 16-bit CRC
  • ZMODEM used 16-bit or 32-bit CRC

Most of these are mainly meant to make fairly likely that a garbled transmission is detected as bad, but...

not focusing on the best probability of that detection (CRC is decent, the rest is not)
not error correction (without retransmission)
not strong against ill intent (see cryptographic hash for that).

Slightly more robust variants

On keyspace size

When you transfer a large chunk of data, e.g. large downloads, keyspace size matters a little, in that how likely you are likely to get the right hash with wrong data is a probability that lowers with larger spaces.

...but lower very quickly, so while 16 bits probably isn't enough, and 32-bit is meh, there are simple and fast hashes like MD5 (128 bit) or SHA-1 (160 bit) that are arguably already overkill for this use.


That serial port check bit has a roughly 1 in 2 chance. Which is why we rarely use it.
that GPS byte, no matter how much smarter you could calculate it, when garbled still has approximately a 1 in 256 chance in matching.

On avalance effect

Not all hashes are robust to certain structural errors.

For example, one of the simplest hash functions is a simple bytewise XOR, which is usually blindingly fast to execute,

But if, say, data was transmitted over a 7-bit serial line (that never sends high highest bit in bytes), this would check out perfectly while garbling any bytes that used that bit.

Sure, that's a somewhat pathological example, but hashes with at least some avalance effect are simple to make, and solve this particular issue.

It's also why throwing a cryptographic hashes at a problem can rarely hurt, even if you otherwise don't need it.

Hash as identifier

Message digest

Supporting data structures

This article/section is a stub — probably a pile of half-sorted notes, is not well-checked so may have incorrect bits. (Feel free to ignore, fix, or tell me)

Authenticity via hashes

See also: