Security notes - security for the everyday person: Difference between revisions

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==Is it important to encrypt my laptop or phone?==
==Is it important to encrypt...===
===Is it important to encrypt my laptop or phone?===


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tl;dr:  
tl;dr:  
* if you think you'll lose it, and want to ensure that the next reboot people will have a ''hard'' time getting in, yes.
* if you think it'll get stolen specifically for the data on it, sure
 
* it helps against some [[evil maid]] style attacks
 
* if you think a not-specifically-interested thief might still poke around, and want peace of mind that they can't, yes
:: it's not hard to lose a phone


* do not assume encrypted devices do much against law enforcement,  
* do not assume encrypted devices do much against law enforcement,  
:: in that in a lot of places, you are more or less ''required'' to give them access somehow, and your refusal will have implications
:: in that in a lot of places, you are more or less ''required'' to give them access somehow, and your refusal will have implications
* if you want to sure that after the next reboot people will have a ''hard'' time getting in, yes.
: '''but''' If it's still on, you might be protected by nothing other than screen lock




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{{comment|(and unlike most other kinds of devices, not taking them there ''defeats their point'' so people just ''will do that'')}}.
{{comment|(and unlike most other kinds of devices, not taking them there ''defeats their point'' so people just ''will do that'')}}.


But also that more design went into




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==Is it important to encrypt my PC?==
===Is it important to encrypt my PC?===
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tl;dr:
: if you think it'll get stolen specifically for the data on it, yes.


tl;dr:  
: it helps against some [[evil maid]] style attacks
: if you think it'll get stolen for the data on it, yes.


: if you like the related peace of mind, yes
: if you think a not-specifically-interested thief might still poke around, and want peace of mind that they can't, yes


: yet practically
: yet practically
:: people don't generally take their PCs anywhere - LAN parties happen... less than since the nineties
:: people don't generally take their PCs anywhere - [[LAN parties]] happen... less than since the nineties
:: the first two of the above assumes you are a person of interest, and someone is taking the time specifically on you
:: even theft by non-interested people is not too much threat. Yes, they could poke around, but chances are that they or the next owner will just reinstall the thing.
:: even theft by non-interested people is not too much threat. Yes, they could poke around, but chances are that they or the next owner will just reinstall the thing.


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:: ...or other things
:: ...or other things
* added disks would have to be separately encrypted
* added disks would have to be separately encrypted
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===Is it important to have secure boot / Trusted Execution features / pre-boot authentication===
It depends on your threat model.
Each of these helps in different ways,
but none of them may be overly relevant.
Say, if you have full disk encryption, physical access does not immediately get people into that data,
but you might care about an [[evil maid]] style attack -- someone tampering with an unattended device,
in this case e.g. to get you to type a password into something that is something else.
Secure boot help ensure you are typing a password into the right thing.
At least, it ups the stakes of the attack - which would now have to replace ''firmware'',
which is very high-effort (complex and model-specific).
Trusted execution
Pre-boot authentication e.g. disables drive reads until,
it e.g. means people cannot boot a liveUSB environment without ''you'',
but neither of these things adds anything when you use full-disk encryption anyway.
Pre-boot auth
Full disk encryption ups the
However, if the device is password protected, as with full disk encryption, the firmware of the device needs to be compromised, usually done with an external drive




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Most people are not helped by them, but it depends on your [[threat model]].


If not, you might just buy into [[fear, uncertainty, and doubt]], and/or a sales pitch, and are not more secure.


Which can even have net-negative effect, when nothing changed,
when you only ''think'' you are safer, and act more careless.


Depends.


In security, you do [[threat modeling]], a.k.a. figuring out '''what problem you are trying to solve''',
because it's easy to solve a problem you didn't really have, or focuses on a smaller but forgets a larger issue.


In which case we bought into [[fear, uncertainty, and doubt]], and/or a sales pitch, and are not more secure.
'''Do you want to be anonymous?'''
 
Your ISP knows who you are.
You specifically told them when you asked them to put hardware in your house.
 
Instagram, facebook, and twitter know who you are.
You specifically tell them every time you log in. VPN ''cannot'' do anything to change that.
 
Sites that do not ask for login (and do not try to track you) already didn't know before, and still don't with VPNs.
 
Sites that do [[browser fingerprinting]] tricks to try always worked, and still do with VPNs.
 
So nothing changed.
 
 
'''Do you want to be harder to place?'''
 
Internet address based [[geolocation]] will generally do no better than place you in a city
(See also [[Javascript_notes_-_browser_related,_APIs#Geolocation_API]]),
but there are people, such as livestreamers, who do care about that.
 
With VPNs, IP geolocation will locate the VPN servers instead.
 
...assuming, of course, you don't tell that site it is allowed to geolocate you in other ways.
 
 
 
'''Do you want to hide your browsing traffic from passive snooping (e.g. coffee shop)?'''
 
For one, this is sort of illegal, so generally not done
 
 
If you want to hide your browing traffic -- -- it 99% was already


Which can even have net-negative effect, when nothing changed,
when you only ''think'' you are safer, and act more careless.





Latest revision as of 17:32, 27 June 2024

Security related stuff.


Linux - PAM notes · SELinux

Securing services


A little more practical


More techincal waffling

Message signing notes · Hashing notes ·
Auth - Kinds of auth setup · identity and auth notes ·· OAuth notes · OpenID notes Kerberos notes · · SASL notes
Encryption - Encryption notes · public key encryption notes · data-at-rest encryption ·pre-boot authentication · encrypted connections

Unsorted - · Anonymization notes · website security notes · integrated security hardware · Glossary · unsorted

Is it important to use antivirus/malware protection?

Is it important to encrypt...=

Is it important to encrypt my laptop or phone?

Is it important to encrypt my PC?

Is it important to encrypt my external drive?

Is it important to use two-factor authentication?

Is it important to use a password manager?

Is it important to use a VPN?

Is it important to use secure mail?

So these messenging apps are the end-all then?