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==Runtime protection (SGX, SEV, etc.)==
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SGX is a trusted execution environment that allows runtime definition of private regions of RAM.
These enclaves can be encrypted transparently by the CPU,
meaning that they should be opaque to other processes and, ''in theory'', a malicious hypervisor.
SEV (and SME) is the closest comparable AMD thing, and it seems a little more thorough.
(TrustZone the closst ARM thing?)
The currention generation of SGX and SEV are broken in different ways -
different promises, different implementation weaknesses,
and it's not an apples-to-apples comparison
in that how broken it is to you depends on your threat model.
Both still are likely to increase the amount of effort, and audit trial,
and the next iteration of both is likely to be better.
(and there's always people pointing out [[side-channel attacks]],
but that is another threat model that is exceptional to many)
Uninformed copy-paste, but it seems part of the problem is that when you want to avoid cloud machines peeking into your VMs,
then the OS has to assume ''all'' hardware is malicious, which was never a threat model before,
and a costly one to active protect against.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_Guard_Extensions
https://www.amd.com/en/developer/sev.html
-->


==Pre-boot authentication==
==Pre-boot authentication==

Latest revision as of 23:17, 20 April 2024

Security related stuff.


Linux - PAM notes · SELinux

Securing services


A little more practical


More techincal waffling

Message signing notes · Hashing notes ·
Auth - identity and auth notes
Encryption - Encryption notes · public key encryption notes · data-at-rest encryption ·pre-boot authentication · encrypted connections

Unsorted - · Anonymization notes · website security notes · integrated security hardware · Glossary · unsorted

This article/section is a stub — some half-sorted notes, not necessarily checked, not necessarily correct. Feel free to ignore, or tell me about it.


Pre-boot authentication

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pre-boot_authentication

Nonce

Challenge/response

JSON Web Signature, Encryption, Tokens

This article/section is a stub — some half-sorted notes, not necessarily checked, not necessarily correct. Feel free to ignore, or tell me about it.

GSSAPI notes

GSSAPI is a IETF standard to make it easier for various software to do various strong auth, e.g. Kerberos.

It also allows various other auth schemes to be plugged into it.


Which also makes it potentially interesting for SSO setups within an organisation.


(not unlike SASL, which can include GSSAPI)


It's used by things like OpenSSH,

NaCl

There are two security related things called NaCl - which are completely unrelated to each other.

(There are also other things called salt, like automation software Salt (a.k.a. Saltstack)


NaCl as in libsodium

Google NaCl

Side note: Asymmetric v.s. symmetric keys

Simpler systems had symmetric keys, meaning that the encoding and decoding key was the same.


This allows encryption in both ways -- and that both parties have to trust each other mutually.

You have to trust neither will accidentally or purposefully leak the key, because that key means all possible abilities including

reading received encrypted data from, current or past
imitating the other side's data





That's usually fine between two parties, but sharing the same key between more than two is as weak as the weakest link. Again,

reading all parties' encrypted data from, current or past
imitating all parties involved


This is arguably the largest problem that public-private key systems target (there are other upsides):

given the public key of someone's (public,private) keypair, it is nearly impossible to calculate the private one
ideally even with any number of encrypted messages

...which is why it isn't a problem to hand the public ones out.